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Saudi Arabia’s little touted effort to overhaul its defense and national security architecture may be the United States’ best bet to rebuild relations with the kingdom in ways that imbue values and complicate the establishment of similar defense ties with China or Russia.
“Through the vehicle of defense reform, the Biden administration has an opportunity to engage the Saudis on critical national security matters while safeguarding US strategic interests and honoring American values,” said political-military analyst and former Pentagon official Bilal Y. Saab.
“It’s a wise form of US assistance that isn’t politically controversial, doesn’t cost much US taxpayer money, and doesn’t require a significant US presence on the ground. It is perhaps the only way to reset the currently tense relationship by gradually rebuilding trust between the two sides,” Mr. Saab concluded in a detailed study amid debate about the future of US-Saudi relations and controversy over a visit to the kingdom by President Joe Biden earlier this month.
Mr. Biden’s visit may have helped persuade Saudi Arabia to divert to Europe oil shipments destined for Asia but did little to restore Middle Eastern confidence in the reliability of the United States as a global leader and security guarantor.
If anything the visit served to rehabilitate Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s reputation, tarnished by the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi with little in return in terms of, for example, human rights in the kingdom.
Drawing a comparison to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 economic reform and diversification plan, Mr. Saab argued that the development of implementation mechanisms that are refined as plans move forward would determine the success of the defense and other change programmes.
“What Riyadh lacks in Vision 2030 is not strategies or ideas—it has plenty of those—but processes that help get them from point A to point B. It’s the same problem with the defense transformation plan,” Mr. Saab argued.
“The trick for well-intentioned American advisers involved in the Saudi defense transformation plan is to get the Saudis to stop treating it as an end in itself and get them to work on essential processes they desperately need to defend the kingdom today and adequately plan for the future,” he added.
The overhaul of the defense and national security architecture, the most radical military reform since the creation of Saudi Arabia in 1932, aims to enable the kingdom to defend itself, absorb and utilize US weapons systems, and make meaningful military and defense contributions to regional security,” Mr. Saab said. If successful, the reforms would offer “invaluable lessons for US military assistance across the region.”
So far, “the kingdom has been the model of dysfunctional US-Arab military cooperation, representing everything that has gone wrong in US-Arab defense ties,” Mr. Saab, who at the Pentagon had oversight responsibilities for US Central Command that operates in the Middle East, noted.
“For far too long, Washington has sold the Saudis and other Arab partners expensive weapons they either didn’t need or know how to use and sustain properly, never bothering to assist them in developing their armed forces so they could ably assume their own national-security duties,” Mr. Saab asserted.
Over the years, Saudi expenditure on the acquisition of arms, among the highest in the world, juxtaposed with the kingdom’s inability to perform on the battlefield and defend itself, made it the butt of jokes and ridicule.
The Saudi failure was one driver of past widespread empathy with jihadists who, with 9/11 and until the defeat of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, appeared able to achieve more with less.
To be sure, Gulf states have progressed since the days when they were unable to field a military response to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait and needed the international community to come to their rescue.
Saudi Arabia has since fielded and sustained a military force in Yemen for the past seven years but has been unable to reverse the territorial and strategic advances of the Houthi rebels or prevent one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.
Mr. Bin Salman, who has gained complete control of all of Saudi Arabia’s defense and security forces since coming to office, has been driven in his national security reforms by the lessons of the war in Yemen, Houthi and/or Iranian attacks on oil and other critical infrastructure in the kingdom as well as the United Arab Emirates, and the US failure to respond robustly to those incidents.
“Instead of breaking or downgrading defense ties with the Americans, the Saudis wisely chose to more effectively partner with them and seek their advice on how to create a better-functioning defense establishment. Washington answered the call,” Mr. Saab said.
But Mr. Saab cautioned that while “this change in the US attitude toward defense relations with Saudi Arabia and Saudi self-defense is monumental, necessary, and overdue,” it was only one part of the equation. “The Saudis still have to execute, and given the broad scope of their defense reforms, the journey will be long and arduous,” he said.
Mr. Bin Salman set the tone for the reforms by noting, “when I enter a base in Saudi Arabia, I find the ground is made of marble, walls are ornamented and finished with high quality. When I enter a base in America, I see no ceiling; the ground is neither furnished with carpets nor made of marble, but only concrete and practical.”
The state of Saudi defense was abysmal before the launch of the reforms in 2017.
“Saudi Arabia had no ability to formulate a coherent national-defense strategy nor any effective operational and tactical guidance for its armed forces. Vision existed only in the minds of one or two Western-educated royals close to the king, and there were no clear procedures to ably communicate strategic and policy direction to the military,” Mr. Saab said.
The Saudis lacked systematic defense analysis and strategic planning to prioritize missions and capabilities and identify requirements, which would have helped them avoid buying expensive equipment they did not need.
Analysis and planning world have also enabled them to monitor, assess, evaluate, or improve the readiness levels of their troops. Similarly, Saudi ground and air forces could not communicate with one another, which made coordination all but impossible.
Saudi air and missile defense may be where the kingdom has progressed the most. It has intercepted hundreds of Houthi missile and drone attacks, even if some have defeated Saudi defenses.
“Many of Saudi Arabia’s defense problems…still exist. What’s encouraging, though, is that the Saudis, under MBS’s (Mohammed bin Salman’s) leadership, now recognize these deficiencies and seem, for the first time, determined to address them in partnership with the United States and to a degree with the United Kingdom.,” Mr. Saab said.
Atmospherics and public posturing may be one thing, the nitty gritty of US-Saudi cooperation another. In the ultimate analysis, cutting through the noise to focus on what is happening in the real world may be the best measure of the future of US-Saudi relations. And that may be a more optimistic picture than meets the eye.
NATO Bracing for a New Security Competition
Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title, Comparative Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, co-authored with Dr. Teresita Cruz-Del Rosario and three forthcoming books, Shifting Sands, Essays on Sports and Politics in the Middle East and North Africaas well as Creating Frankenstein: The Saudi Export of Ultra-conservatism and China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom.
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‘Transformative’ is how NATO’s Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg described the alliance’s 2022 Madrid summit and rightly so. Held soon after the fateful G-7 summit — wherein the leaders from seven industrialized nations vowed to pool $600 billion to fund infrastructure projects in developing countries in a bid to counter China’s multi-trillion dollar BRI — NATO’s Madrid summit in effect laid the groundwork for the security competition between the USA-led ‘democracies’ and the ‘authoritarian’ strategic competitors — China and Russia.
Unsurprisingly, the happenings in Ukraine topped the agenda, and to enable the beleaguered country ‘prevail as an independent state’, the NATO leadership promised ‘long-term support’ to Ukraine — which includes providing training to the Ukrainian military and supplying them with cutting-edge weapons systems.
Western leaders have been framing Ukraine as the new frontline in the clash between democracy and authoritarianism, and President Biden pledged during the summit to support Ukraine “as long as it takes”. Conversely, the leadership in Moscow has linked the security of Russia with the outcome of the war in Ukraine. The high stakes on both sides suggest that the tussle in Ukraine is unlikely to end anytime soon and would continue to fuel the security competition between Russia and the USA-led NATO.
Provided the context, it’s hardly surprising that NATO’s Strategic Concept 2022 describes Russia as the ‘most significant and direct threat’ to the alliance and has pledged to respond to the ‘hostile actions’ by Russia in a ‘united’ way.
Predictably, the USA — the only nation with a global military footprint — is in the vanguard once again. After sending 20,000 additional troops to Europe earlier, President Biden committed during the summit to establish a permanent headquarters of the US Fifth Army Corps in Poland and maintain 3,000 men strong additional rotational brigade and another 2,000 personnel combat team headquartered in Romania. Moreover, POTUS announced to increase the number of Navy destroyers in Spain’s Rota Naval Base and send two additional F-35 squadrons to the UK, besides stationing additional air defense capabilities in Germany and Italy. Further, he announced to work towards strengthening USA-NATO interoperability along the alliance’s eastern flank bordering Russia.
Apart from the USA, European countries are also scrambling to redress their decades of underinvestment in defense. Days after the Russian invasion, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced to increase the defense spending above 2% of the GDP — a ceiling not touched in more than three decades. Given Germany’s decades-long pacifist military posture aimed at shaking off the country’s aggressive military past, a commitment to such a significant raise — which also includes an instant allocation of €100 billion to modernize the country’s shabby armed forces — is indubitably a watershed for Germany’s military future.
Other European nations — most notably, Belgium, Romania, Italy, Poland, Norway, and Sweden — soon followed suit pledging to significantly increase their defense spending, and traditionally non-aligned Finland and Sweden underwent a fundamental policy transition to avail protection under NATO’s Article V, besides announcing a substantial increase in their military expenses.
Although Russia is categorized as a direct threat to NATO, the primary strategic challenge to the USA-led ‘democratic’ world is posed by an aggrandizing China. Before the summit, NATO allies wrangled over how to address China in the strategic concept and finally settled on branding the world’s second-largest economy as posing ‘systemic challenges’ to Euro-Atlantic security. However, given the commercial façade of the West’s relationship with China — especially that of Germany and France — a balancing attempt was made by maintaining open the door for ‘constructive engagement’ with Beijing.
Likewise, NATO’s Strategic Concept categorizes the ‘deepening strategic partnership’ between China and Russia as ‘running counter’ to Western interests and values. Remarkably, in a first, the USA’s Pacific allies Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand were invited to attend a NATO summit, which is a testament to Washington’s stratagem to assemble a global coalition aimed at countering ’no limits’ partnership between China and Russia. The formation of opposing coalitions led or at least dominated by contesting superpowers provide the harbinger of what could be the new balance of power configuration with global latitude.
Hardly surprising, an increased emphasis on values and rules accompanied by the frequent mentioning of ‘authoritarian actors’ challenging western ideals in NATO’s updated strategic concept and Western leadership’s addresses are reflective of Western governments’ propensity to affix an ideological angle with intrinsically power struggle and to render even starker the binary between the forces of democracy and authoritarianism in a renascence of the Cold War ideological tussle.
In a blunt departure from its preceding mission statement issued in 2010, which adopted an optimistic tone about arms control and non-proliferation, and envisioned lessened reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO’s strategy — Strategic Concept 2022 categorizes nuclear as the foremost among the mix of capabilities to realize NATO’s fundamental task of ‘deterrence and defense’. Strategic Stability is deservedly described to be undermined by the steady erosion of the arms control framework for which paradoxically the Western world also shares responsibility. Moreover, citing the expansion and modernization of Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals and their delivery means, the alliance has vowed to undertake all the necessary measures to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of its deterrence capability — besides working to ensure cross-domain integration and coherence of capabilities and activities. The developments bear out that the era of arms control and nuclear reduction is all but over and the world is moving into an unprecedented era of the nuclear arms race, wherein at least three strategic competitors would be vying for nuclear supremacy — unless some highly unlikely arms control framework averts the imminent tripolar arms race, fraught with unforeseen challenges.
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A number of Chinese academics and scholars studying abroad are directly related to the (Third Technical Department of the People’s Liberation Army). Here, Chinese intelligence agencies work differently from all other spy organizations and devices around the world, through (employing academics or students and scholars in the first place, who are in the concerned country for research and study for only a short period, and then return again to their countries to supply them with advanced technologies and research), and that Instead of spending years cultivating a limited number of high-profile sources or double agents within those communities.
The United States of America accuses the Chinese army of developing what is known as (scientific and research network technology from academics and researchers within American and Western universities) in order to obtain technology and information from many countries, including: (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, UK, India, USA).
In the same context, the (Indian Intelligence and Analysis Service) accused the Chinese side of using dozens of study centers for China, which it set up in the state of “Nepal” near the Indian border, in part for the purposes of spying on India. Also, in August 2011, we findthat the (Chinese research vessel disguised as a fishing vessel) was discovered off the coast of Little Andaman, collecting data in a geographically sensitive area.
In the state of Singapore, the Chinese researcher “Huang Jing”, a Chinese academic who was studying at (Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy) in Singapore, was expelled, because of his frank accusation of using his influence for the benefit of the Chinese intelligence services.
A number of Chinese military universities are active abroad through their network of students and alumni, led by the (Chinese People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Sciences)
(中国人民解放军军事科学研究院)
The Academy of Military Science of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (AMS)
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Academy is the most important research institute in China. It is directly affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the capital, Beijing. Since June 2017, it has been headed by the Chinese military commander with the rank of Lieutenant-General (Yang Xiujun), while the General Major (Fang Xiang) is occupied by The position of political commissar.
The Academy of Military Medical Sciences in the capital, Beijing, is one of the most famous and most important military universities in China, known in English and Chinese, as:
The Academy of Military Medical Sciences
中国人民解放军 军事 科学院 军事 医学 研究
It is directly affiliated with the (Chinese People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Sciences), and is mainly concerned with military medical research, and was initially established in Shanghai in 1951, then its headquarters was moved to Beijing again in 1958. Here, (Nanjing University of Aeronautics) is also one of the most important Chinese military universities in the field of space, and its graduates are active abroad. Here, the “National University of Defense Technology of China” is the most important of all, which is directly affiliated with the Central Military Commission of China, known as:
NUDT
As one of the most important Chinese military universities whose students and graduates cooperate academically and research with their counterparts in a large number of German and European universities. The relationship between the (National University of Defense Technology of China) and those close to the Chinese military departments is at the forefront of those close relations between China’s military universities and their European counterparts. Investigating the matter, it was found that there were nearly 3,000 cases of coordination between European universities and Chinese researchers close to the Chinese military in the period between early 2000 and February 2022. The coordination focused mainly on sensitive areas, such as: (artificial intelligence, computer vision, and quantum research).
It also designed (Nanjing Military Command College), which has a history spanning more than 71 years in the form of a Chinese garden, located near (Nanjing National High-Tech Zone). It was among the first group of Chinese military circles opened to foreigners. It has trained nearly 4,000 mid- or senior-level foreign officers from more than 100 countries over the past years. It opens its doors to foreign military students at Asay, who mainly study in (Chinese Military Thinking and Courses of Leadership, Management and the Art of Leadership), during their one-year stay, and it has extended and high-level relations through its military graduates mainly with many universities and research and technology institutes abroad.
China was keen to send many Chinese scientists to work at (Los Almos Laboratory in New Mexico, where the nuclear bomb was born, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, which plays a key role in the US nuclear weapons program these days, and the Air Force Research Laboratory at Wright Base Patterson Air Force, Ohio). After the return of a large number of Chinese scientists from (Los Almos Laboratory), they returned to work again in Chinese universities and research institutes, and they are called the “Los Almos Club”. The Los Alamos Laboratory is home to a wide range of advanced US defense research facilities.
In order to find out how close the links are between European universities and Chinese military universities, a European research association, led by the (Dutch Investigative Platform)
Follow the Money
Known as (Follow the Money), it compiled and evaluated a data record from more than 350,000 scientific publications, with the support of the German non-profit research center “Corective” to identify and track graduates of Chinese military universities, who are studying and enrolled for study and research in German and Western universities.
It was also found that about 2,200 of these publications were issued by the “National University of Defense Technology”, which is a real factory for cadres in China. As for the European universities that cooperated with Chinese University researchers, almost half were from the United Kingdom, which took the lead, followed by the Netherlands and Germany. At least 230 research papers have been written, jointly with Chinese University researchers. Therefore, the largest role falls mainly to the “National University of Defense Technology of China”.
Many of the best talents in the army are trained there, especially in the fields of technology and natural sciences. The focus of Chinese researchers has long been on the (Australian Strategic Policy Institute), which knows as:
ASPI
It is the institute whose main task is to monitor the work of military universities in China, especially the work activities of the “National University of Defense Technology of China”, which plays a (critical role in all kinds of military research projects, from hypersonic projects, i.e. supersonic speed), from nuclear weapons to supercomputers. Here, American, Australian and Western intelligence reports confirm, with the possibility that behind half of the publications there is a “Chinese military officer who studied at a European university, worked and established a relationship that led to cooperation”.
In general, this kind of research cooperation between Chinese scholars and researchers and Western universities is not officially or completely prohibited. Scientific research and collective cooperation in German universities is free, according to the Basic Law in Germany. But in fact, almost unrestricted scientific cooperation with China was politically desirable, in order to establish a foothold in the huge Chinese market. It was not only Germany that hoped that intensive relations in the fields of business, science and culture would contribute to the democratic opening of the communist state.
China never hides its ambition and desire, that by 2050, it wants to become the world’s leading Science and technology superpower in playing a major role in this framework. China is pursuing a fierce military-civilian integration strategy that blurs the boundaries between civil, commercial and military research, and here every citizen has a duty to serve his country militarily, through science.
Another thing in China’s strategy, no less important, is the transfer of technology from abroad, especially in open scientific research societies such as Germany, like the “strawberry shop, which goes in, picks up and takes what it wants”.
A large number of studies have already been published by German researchers at the (Universities of Bonn & Stuttgart & the Fraunhofer Institute in Germany), in cooperation with Chinese researchers from the (National University of Defense Technology). Several studies have also been published in Germany with a Chinese research associate from the (National University of Defense Technology), and this researcher has won many military awards, including the “People’s Liberation Army Distinguished Doctoral Thesis Award”.
But the complicated question here, remains: What is allowed? What research requires obtaining a license? The Basic Law in Germany protects the freedom of scientific research. The (Federal Office for Economics and Export Control) “BAFA” in Germany decided to evaluate the situation after studying each case separately, and the decision is also made on the number of problematic cases, especially those related to Chinese students and researchers. Here, universities must apply for “export licenses” in the case of projects where military use appears possible. This also includes scientific publications with researchers from outside the European Union.
Here we find that, in principle, basic research is free, but applied research is not. The difference between them is that the latter is specifically directed to a specific goal. However, the responsibility for naming the research project’s dual-use status (for civil or military purposes or both) is clear, and here the application for this rests with European universities only, as they must submit a so-called “end-use permit” to the one who authorizes the nature of the research project, which is based on (Civilian use or its extension to the necessity of applied military use of research).
Here, the (Federal Office for Economics and Export Control in Germany) did not wish to comment on whether licenses were obtained to export the publications identified by the research group and its partners, for reasons related to the protection of personal data. When the two German universities concerned were asked, they replied in writing that the publications in question were related to “basic research” and therefore, as they put it, “these licenses are not required”. The two universities indicated that they do not have any official cooperation with (China’s National University of Defense Technology). However, it is clear that this does not rule out cooperation between them, but at the individual level, that is, at the level of Chinese researchers and scholars separately.
The confirmation of the two universities concerned that the relationship between the Chinese co-author and the “National University of Defense Technology” was known, and that agreements, especially with foreign partners, were “carefully vetted”, with the university abiding by laws and regulations in force in Germany and confirming that it provides advisory offers and information Written to educate teachers and students.
Additionally, the (Germany’s Fraunhofer Institute), said it does not comment on individual works, but added that each case is examined with particular attention to the “sensitive cooperation issues relating to key technologies and in which there is a risk of an uncontrolled drain of scientific ingenuity”. But, The (National University of Defense Technology) did not respond to a request for comment.
On the other hand, many foreign academics expressed their desire to raise the level of awareness of the potential risks among universities and supervising scholars regarding mainly Chinese scholars. Starting in 2020, all Chinese researchers wishing to study at German universities have been submitted to a “background check” by the German Foreign Ministry when applying for a visa.
We find that the level of private evaluations of European and German universities is “superficial at best” with regard to Chinese scholars, according to export control officials at German and Western scientific institutions, as they check applicants’ names and compare them to those on US and European sanctions lists. But “as long as the researchers did not mention the Chinese army in their bios”, there are hardly any other controls or reservations about them.
In general, the German and Western sides in general consider the advantages of cooperation with China above all, and consider that most of the cases of Chinese scholars and researchers they have, take the form of paying full fees from China, and China pays all fees and expenses. With confirmation that any Chinese student in Germany is now working after graduating from German and European universities in any military and security institution in China, such as: (the Chinese army cadres factory), it is no longer possible to exchange ideas with them. But if the Chinese researcher leaves work at the (National University of Defense Technology), he can continue his research and academic work again in German and Western universities.
We conclude from the previous analysis of the Egyptian researcher, that the progress made by the Chinese in (the fields of missile technologies, nuclear weapons and artificial intelligence) has raised serious concern among many Western observers who believe that a radical revolution has taken place in the balance of military power on a global scale. Especially with the orders of the Chinese President, Comrade “Xi Jinping”, to fully modernize the Chinese armed forces by 2035. Until his country’s armed forces become a “globally superior” military force, so that it can fight a group and achieve victory in it, by 2049. This is undoubtedly an ambitious goal for the Chinese side, and real and practical steps have begun on its way to achieving it through its network of students, academic scholars and researchers around the world.
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With the introduction of Agenda 2030, the world recognised the need of attaining gender equality and empowering all women and girls in order to achieve long-term development. Furthermore, it is commonly accepted that “gender equality and women’s empowerment are critical across all SDGs and targets.” Gender equality in general focuses on women’s equal involvement in decision-making processes. Over the last two decades, the international community has been increasingly aware of the significance of women’s engagement in peace and security concerns. The diplomatic area of weapons control, nonproliferation, and disarmament covers a wide range of issues and forums.
Gender in Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations
Women and disarmament is an important relationship that has been recognized through a series of resolutions at the United Nations. The Women, Peace and Security Agenda was established through the UNSCR 1325. Women, disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation was adopted through UNGAR 65/69 in 2010. In 2012, the UNGAR 67/48 was adopted that encouraged member states and other actors to advocate equal opportunities for women in disarmament and decision-making processes.
There are many hindrances that women face when they are involved in decision making processes. This can be seen in every level of the society from local to global context. This can also be seen in arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament discussions. There has been increase in the efforts of removing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and administer arms in the last 40 years. However, the number of women involved in these negotiations is small.
Women will be able to bring their own unique experience and point of view that might be helpful in negotiations. People with different background or gender in gender bring their own opinion and challenge the idea that are put forth by letting them to think outside the box. This would in turn make the actors confront various perspectives and come out of their comfort zone. Both genders aim to eradicate these harmful weapons. However, when men go to war they inevitably use these weapons. The use of such weapons affects both men and women but they don’t affect them the same way. Women get impacted due to biological and social circumstances. The diversity in negotiations also changes the belief that everyone has similar background, ideas and most importantly needs. When there is an opportunity given to women in negotiation processes, their standpoint and give birth new ways of thinking. This resolves deadlocks and achieves various objectives.
With this information it is important to have women in negotiation processes as women are also impacted by negotiating outcomes. Therefore the importance of women participation in negotiating platforms on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament is even greater.
Participation of Women in Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
Women’s participation in global arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament procedures vary widely throughout the world. Latin American and Caribbean countries, for example, have the greatest proportion of female diplomats in international forums, at approximately 40%. Africa has the smallest number of female representatives. They are, however, particularly active in campaigning for gender views on platforms dealing with small guns and light weapons.
In the year 2018, women were involved only in 14 of the 19 delegations of the six peace processes that were led by the UN. The number in these delegations was extremely low. When taking talking about the Blue Helmets, only about 3% of the military in UN missions are women. Even if women are employed, they are delegated with support work.
Gender imbalance in disarmament diplomacy persists, according to a UN Institute for Disarmament Research study. Women made up just 32% of attendees in disarmament-related meetings during the previous four decades. When it comes to specialists from the government, the ratio drops to 20%. The UN General Assembly’s First Committee, which deals with disarmament and international security, had the lowest percentage of women present, at 34%. Furthermore, just one of the 72 meetings was headed by a woman. The Third Committee that deals with social, humanitarian and cultural issues have the highest number of women. Thus we can deduce that gender has been stereotyped. It was more difficult to discern typecasting within the various realms of disarmament. It has been identified by other researchers that fields such as nuclear posture and deterrence policy to be more male-dominated and not welcoming when compared to the arms control and non-proliferation area that are more welcoming to including women.
The lack of gender equality may be shown in weapons control by looking at the number of women in senior roles. In terms of the number of representations, it is clear that men lead delegations. Even though the gap between women and men is decreasing, it can’t be seen reflected in the number of delegations that are led by women.
The Effectiveness and Implications of Gender Balance in Disarmament Negotiations
Even though there is a great deal of effort being put into achieving a gender balance that is numerical at negotiation tables, it is important not to note that only the presence of women does not innately mean it brings a positive result or greater results. When women are not allowed to make decisions, for example if women do not hold any leading/decision-making positions or a position that can influence it. Numerical representations barely make any difference. This also does not mean that just having one woman in an influential position is better than a gender-balanced table.
Including women in specific issues and agendas can also lead to the inclusion of provisions that can shape socio-political reform. The gender that is usually excluded from negotiations mostly remains marginalized during post-conflict politics and also is largely absent from peace agreement texts. Women are generally more aware of the gender impacts due to arms and other weapons.
When women are given positions that can influence negotiations, they can overall improve the women’s socio-economic position. If women aren’t active participants in negotiations with a voice that can influence, there will be low chances of provision that aims at gender equality and socio-economic development that are usually part of peace agreements. Therefore, exclusion of women from negotiations will continue to maintain their political marginalization and therefore reduce the chances for political reform.
Because women make up half of the world’s population, they should be as involved in nuclear policy deliberations as they are in any other topic that impacts their lives. On the international level, nuclear disarmament discussions are now dominated by men. Women have distinct life experiences than men, and their capacity for ‘adaptive creativity’ is most likely underappreciated. Involving more women in nuclear policy may result in unique, unanticipated insights and alternatives. Women’s increased participation in nuclear policy may pave the way for new perspectives and avenues for progress. Merely having more women at the negotiating table is not enough; a structural reworking of the entire international system is required to truly account for women’s experiences and make the international system more inclusive for them. The role of women diplomats in nuclear negotiations is significantly increasing but there is still a long way to go. More women need to be given important roles at the leadership level so that they can bring in some influential difference at the negotiation table. Countries also need to make change within them as national interests are projected at the negotiation table.
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